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~ IN THE SUPREME COURT 
lilt ~ OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
' 
:t.; TOM NORTHERN, 
-......: Plaintiff and Respondent, 
--i 
-· 
' _, 
-vs.-
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORA-
TION, et al. 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7973 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action. was brought by Tom Northern against 
the General .I\Iotors Corporation for damages arising out 
of an accident to a 1951 one and one-half ton Chevrolet 
truck owned by Tom Northern and sold to him by the 
Central Motor Company at Grand Junction, Colorado. 
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant General Motors 
Corporation was negligent in the manufacture, in that 
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the truck was defective and dangerous for use; that they 
failed to properly inspect, test and perfect the steering 
mechanism; plaintiff further alleges that General Motors 
Corporation was negligent in the inspection of the truck. 
The defendant General Motors Corporation admits 
having manufactured and assembled the truck, but denies 
that the truck was defective and denies that it was negli-
gent in the manufacture and inspection of the truck while 
it was being manufactured and assembled and before it 
was sold and delivered to a dealer. 
In particular, plaintiff alleges that the steering 
mechanism on the truck broke and that as a result of 
such breaking the truck went out of control and upset, 
causing personal injury. 
In this case the pitman sector shaft of the steering 
mechanism was found to be broken after the accident. 
The broken parts (Plaintiff's Exhibits Gl, G2, G3 and 
G4) are in evidence and also photographs of the same 
parts (Plaintiff's Exhibits J, K, L, 0, P, and W; De-
fendant's Exhibit 4) and can illustrate and explain 
better than can be written here. Defendant's Exhibit 7 
is a blueprint in evidence, which shows the relation of 
the pitman sector shaft in the operation of the steering 
mechanism. 
~rhe accident in question occurred about a mile and 
three-quarters westward from a mountain pass in the 
State of Nevada known as Sacramento Pass on Highway 
No. 6 between Delta, Utah and Ely, Nevada (R. 86, 87) 
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when the plaintiff, the driver of the truck, was going 
to,vard Ely, Nevada (R. 86). 
The road at the point of the accident is a downward 
grade from Sacramento Pass and is part of a large 
compound curve and it was after making a gradual curve 
to the right where the truck turned over (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits Q, R and S). 
The plaintiff testified ·he was 1n the business of 
cleaning cesspools and septic tanks (R. 73) and that on 
1Iay 18, 1951 he traded a Dodge truck for the Chevrolet 
truck in question. The transaction was made with the 
Central Motor Company of Grand .Junction, Colorado 
(R. 76). After the purchase, plaintiff placed a 740 gal-
lon tank and a sludge pump upon the truck (R. 77; Plain-
tiff's Exhibit A). After working in Colorado and Utah, 
plaintiff was in Monticello, Utah, on or about June 5th 
and he had driven the truck about 975 miles (R. 80, 81). 
Wliile traveling between Monticello and Price, Utah, the 
plaintiff experienced the following (R. 81) : 
''A. Yes, sir. Coming down a little g-rade that 
I was driving between 50 and 60, no more than 
60; I don't know if it happened, it seemed like it 
was a lo"\v road, or mayhe my wheels "",vould need 
balancing, or something made it so rough in the 
road. 
"Q. Hovi' ·would y:m describe that? 
''A. A thrill sort of like a near vvea-ving. 
'' Q. How much of a weave was that? Did you 
cross over the center line of the highway? 
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• 'A. No, sir, it was just a slight weave in the 
road, wobbly. 
'' Q. Did the truck leave the bard surface of 
the highway? 
"A. No, sir, it did not." 
Also, on cross-examination and regarding this same 
experience plaintiff testified (R. 116, 117): 
''A. You mean the feeling I got from it~ 
''Q. Yes. 
''A. It was near in the steering wheel. It 
gave me a funny feeling. 
'' Q. You felt the impulse, whatever it was 
in the steering wheel f 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. At that time. Was it a sensation of the 
steering wheel just for a very few moments going 
to the right and to the left? 
"A. No sir, you couldn't say it was that way. 
It was just a wiggle. 
"Q. Just about what you are illustrating, is 
it notf 
"A. Yes sir. 
'' Q. You are illustrating of it going quickly 
from the right to the left? 
"A. Yes sir. You couldn't say it went no 
foot and a half or two feet. Just little bobbles." 
Upon arriving at Price, Utah, plaintiff had driven 
the truck and its added equipment about 1300 miles and 
at that place took the truck into the Redd Motor Com-
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'>J 
pany of that city for its thousand mile checkup. Among 
other things complaint was made of the front end "kind 
of acted funny" but the Redd :Motor was not apprised 
of the previous "weaving" experience (R. 82, 83). The 
truck was then driven from Price, Utah, to Grand Junc-
tion, Colorado and back to Price, Utah; thence to Salt 
Lake City; thence back to Price, Utah; thence to Spanish 
Fork, Utah; thence to Delta, Utah, and thence to the 
place of the accident and (except for a distance imme-
diately prior to the accident) the truck operated per-
fectly (R. 82, 83, 84, 85 and 86). 
After leaving the top of Sacramento Pass and 
traveling downgrade toward Ely, Nevada, the plaintiff 
testified that while traveling near sixty miles per hour 
he went on down around a curve and then ''the first 
thing I knowed I was in the middle of the road from the 
right side; and I turned by truck back into the right 
side again, and when I went to turn it again, which the 
steering wheel had completely turned plumb around and 
the truck went on about its business." (R. 89.) 
On cross-examination and on this same subject, 
plaintiff testified that after leaving the top of Sacra-
mento Pass and after rounding a curve to the right he 
got over to the left of the center line of the highway and 
that he gradually pulled it back to the right hand side 
(R. 127). Also plaintiff admitted describing the occur-
rence on previous deposition as follows (R. 130, 131): 
''Q. I will ask you whether or not at that time 
in the deposition you made this statement: 'Well, 
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it was just like, oh, just didn't haYe the blacktop 
out, you know, to the ditch. It was a smooth road 
there. And I snatched it back up on the road and 
pulled it back. When I pulled it back I never could 
straighten it up again.' 
"A. That is right, sir. 
"Q. You made that statement, did you not? 
''A. Yes sir, I did. 
'' Q. I will ask you, !1r. Northern, whether or 
not, on that occasion, you made this statement: 
'No sir. When I· tried to turn it back to the right 
again, after pulling it from the right side, pull 
it to the left, and after trying to straighten it 
back to the right again, I could not straighten it. 
That's when I hit the brakes.' 
''A. Yes sir, I did. 
"Q. And right after that do you recall this 
question: 'And what \vas the sensation on the 
steering wheel as you tried to pull it back from 
the right side of the road~' 
' ' 'A. Well just wasn't nothing to turn it back 
with.' You made that statement, did you not? 
''A. Yes sir, I did. 
'' Q. And will you listen to the following ques-
tions and answers, Mr. Northern, on the same 
occasion on the deposition: 'Q. You didn't try 
to spin it at all back~' 
" 'A. Well it done happened, sir. Didn't have 
enough time to do all tl1at. Just steering it, I 
imagining around eight, ten inches ; something 
like that.' 
" 'Q. Then yo~ started tipping over f 
" 'A. It was going over than. 
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~' 'Q. You were going over then f 
" 'A. Yes sir. ' 
"Did you testify to that effect upon the taking 
of this deposition 1 
"A. I don't recollect that, sir. 
"Q. Do you deny now, Mr. Northern, that you 
made such a statement on that occasion 1 
''A. No sir, I do not deny it. I just don't 
recollect it. 
'' Q. And you could have made such a state-
ment, is that right? 
''A. Possible.'' 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 0 and 11 and Defendant's Ex-
hibit 3, admitted in evidence, clearly shows the course 
taken by plaintiff's truck to the time of the upset. 
Plaintiffs then read into evidence the deposition of 
one Gordon \Yertsderfer. 1'Ir. W ertsderfer lived about 
two miles from the summit of Sacramento Pass (R. 159). 
He related that his occupation was that of a machinist 
and combination \velder for forty-five years and that he 
had handled, examined and fashioned forms out of steel 
(R. 163); that he had observed metal surfaces but that 
he had no experience in regard to steering mechanisms 
nor in the automotive line (R. 172, 173). On voir dire 
examination this witness testified that he had learned 
by practical experience and that he had no schooling or 
technical training (R. 168, 169) and that his formal edu-
cation was through the eighth grade (R. 172). 
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Mr. Wertsderfer testified that on June 15, 1951 he 
received word of an accident from one Mike Drakulich 
who runs a place of business on Sacramento Pass and 
that he went to the scene of the accident and saw the 
upset truck (R. 159). He saw the marks on the highway 
as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit 0 (R. 160). This witness 
examined the truck and "in looking at the steering arm" 
he found that it was broken and "that one-sixth of it 
had a flaw in it, that showed traces of rust where the 
flaw had been created" (R. 173). (These conclusions 
were allowed over defendant's objections.) He concluded 
that the rust condition was in the neighborhood of ''six 
weeks old" (R. 173). Mr. Wertsderfer testified that he 
called the attention of his wife and Dr. Drakulich to the 
broken part at the scene of the accident. (R. 176). On 
cross-examination witness W ertsderfer described the 
broken part as chrome steel, eighteen percent carbon, 
medium carbon steel and upon further examination he 
had no knowledge of any other remaining elements of 
the metal, or its composition and structure. (R. 177-184 
incl.) Mr. Wertsderfer agreed that the "splines" on 
Exhibit G-2 were twisted and that it would take great 
force to twist these splines on an inch and one-eighth 
shaft. The witness then described ·where he saw the 
discoloration on the faces of the fracture by marking 
the areas on Exhibit 4. No evidence of crystallization was 
present in the Exhibits. He stated that a crack or open-
ing to allow rust could be visible to the eye if the opening 
was "a half a thousandth or over" (R. 200). In con-
clusion and on cross-examination this witness testified 
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that he had no idea how the "flaw" got in the part in 
question (R. 202). He later surmised that a "jolt" in 
the factory might have caused it (R. 201) although he 
had no knowledge of how the parts are made or put 
together in an automotive plant (R. 202). 
The deposition of ~Irs. Gordon W ertsderfer was 
read by the plaintiff. l\Irs. Wertsderfer testified that 
her husband called her attention to the broken part and 
she observed signs that appeared to be rust (R. 204). On 
cross examination and at the time the deposition was 
taken, l\Irs. W ertsderfer could not see the rust or dis-
coloration that she had referred to upon her direct 
examination. 
Plaintiff then presented Mr. Renold 0. Jenson, who 
stated that he was in the auto repair business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and that he was the person who pur-
chased the damaged truck from Mr. Northern (R. 205). 
Mr. Jensen testified that in the repair of the truck he 
replaced the pitman sector shaft; that the front wheels 
and drag link were not damaged (R. 138) and he de-
scribed further repair work (R. 207). The witness gave 
his opinion that there was no blow on the front end 
because the front end was still on the truck (R. 208). 
He further described ''stops'' to prevent the wheels 
being turned beyond a certain angle (R. 208). In respect 
to lubrication of the broken part he stated that a sleeve 
or bushing covers it and that it has an oiled surface and in 
his opinion rust would not accumulate when the parts 
are assembled (R. 208, 209). 
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On cross-examination the attention of the witness 
was directed for the first time to the apparent twist on 
the splines of the broken part (R. 209) and he stated 
that it would require some type of pull to produce such 
a twist and take a lot of force to break the sector shaft 
and that a sudden jolt may do it (R. 210). From his 
experience, 1\fr. Jenson testified that it depends upon a 
lot of factors which part fails-sometimes one part fails 
-sometimes another, and it depends upon where the 
force is applied (R. 211, 212). 
Plaintiff read into evidence the deposition of Frank 
Snyder. The witness described himself as a machinist 
of forty years experience (R. 216) and at the time of 
the deposition he was and had been employed as a ma-
chinist for Kennecott in Ruth, Nevada, for twenty-five 
to thirty-five years (R. 217). The witness had never done 
any testing of metals (R. 219) and no special studies (R. 
220), no knowledge of chemistry or chemical content (R. 
232), hardness (R. 233, 234), heat treatment (R. 234), 
load requirements (R. 234, 235), modern milling pro-
cesses (R. 238), examined metals under magnification 
(R. 245), and that he "never made a study of it" and 
that it was really none of his business (R. 245). 
fie testified that on June 15, 1951, he was traveling 
in the vicinity of Sacramento Pass and he came upon a 
wrecked truck and that the front end was all "busted". 
He noticed a broken piece and, over objection, stated 
that there was a "flaw" in it (R. 218). He described 
the piece as having been "cracked, and the crack had 
10 
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been oxidized" (R. 223). He described a stain mark the 
color of rust; that the part was fractured before it was 
machined ( R. 226). He examined the part to see if he 
could see anything and stated that the parts have been 
cleaned up (R. 226). As to the time the oxidation existed, 
Mr. Snyder stated that it would be longer than three 
weeks but concluded by stating that he would not pass 
an opinion and if he did it would be a pure guess (R. 
229). 
On cross-examination Mr. Snyder admitted to his 
lack of knowledge of modern steel, its chemistry, com-
position or structure (R. 230, 231, 232 and 233). Mr. 
Snyder, for the first time, noticed that the splines or 
serrations were twisted and immediately concluded that 
there had been an excessive strain on the part, not only 
excessive but a "great" strain on the part (R. 236). Mr. 
Snyder, upon viewing the part at the scene of the acci-
dent, concluded that the rough surface of the fracture 
indicated crystallization but upon deposition failed to 
find any such evidence (R. 240). In explaining this situa-
tion, the witness stated that his first examination had 
been a year or more ago and, in fact, the District Attorney 
(Mr. Collins) had a "heck" of a time convincing him 
that he had seen the wreck (R. 240). Also, in regard to 
the rust the witness was asked to point out the areas 
where the rust was seen and, in response, replied : ''I 
can't show it to you. 'Taint there.'' (R. 241). Mr. Snyder 
then further concluded that the "flaw" was in the metal 
when the part was new but that it did not show on the 
outside (R. 242). He then described the area of the 
11 
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''flaw" as the entire surface of Exhibits G-1 and G-2 
with the exception of the rising edge (R. 242). Mr. 
Snyder testified that an examination under magnification 
might change his opinion of the problem but he refused 
such opportunity, stating, "I can't pass an opinion now, 
after this length of time. Why, hell, I wouldn't give an 
opinion on it" (R. 244, 245). 
The deposition of Mr. Jon Collins of Ely, Nevada, 
was read by the plaintiff into the evidence of the case. 
Mr. Collins was an attorney-at-law and District Attorney 
of White Pine County, Nevada (R. 263). Shortly after 
this accident Mr. Northern consulted Mr. Collins regard-
ing his case and the facts and site of the occurrence were 
investigated by Mr. Collins (R. 263). In the course of 
such investigation, Mr. Collins made various observa-
tions and measurements and identified the various photo-
graphs in evidence of that place (R. 265). Testifying 
concerning the alternate marks shown on Exhibit C, 
Mr. Collins viewed nine such distinct marks averaging 
about four yards a part or a distance in excess of 108 
feet (R. 266). On the left hand side fifteen such alternate 
marks were found by him also averaging in excess of 
four yards apart, or a total distance in excess of 135 
feet (R. 267). The right side left the surfaced part of 
the road and was on the graveled shoulder before turning 
abruptly to the left for a distance of twelve to fifteen 
yards (R. 279). At that point the right hand wheel left 
the macadam about a foot or foot and a half and there 
was no object which was struck or hit (R. 269). Mr. 
Collins described his idea of what caused the solid 
12 
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marks which abruptly crossed the highway to the left 
(R. ~70, 271). Mr. Collins describes the course of the 
Northern vehicle as ''the first swing was slightly to the 
left, at which time the wheels did not leave the macadam. 
Then there was a swing to the right, at which time the 
right wheels left the macadam. And they left the maca-
dam, as I stated previously, about a foot or a foot and 
a half, then there was a violent swing to the left'' (R. 
272). By use of his automobile speedometer, the attorney 
then measured the distance from the point where the 
marks were first observed to the place where they left 
the highway on the left. This distance was .12 of a mile 
or 633.6 feet and in addition to this the truck went into 
a barrow pit, hit and uprooted a substantial tree (R. 273) 
which was a distance of twenty to thirty yards (R. 275). 
At Ely, Nevada, lVIr. Collins examined the truck and 
observed the broken part (R. 276) and later had pos-
session of this part after its removal from the vehicle 
(R. 277). He further observed that the front end was 
"considerably scratched and banged up" (R. 281). Mr. 
Collins later sent the broken part to Mr. Earl R. Parker, 
Professor of Metallurgy, University of California, to 
be examined and received a report from that expert (R. 
282, 283, 284). 
The plaintiff caused the deposition of Earl R. Parker 
to be read into evidence. Mr. Parker related his qualifi-
cations which revealed eminent qualifications as a metal-
lurgist and professor of metallurgy and he has specialized 
in the study of service failures (R. 286, 287). 
13 
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Exhibits G1, G2, G3 and G4, were shown to Mr. 
Parker and he testified they had the same appearance as 
the parts previously sent to him by one Jon Collins of 
Ely Nevada and that he made a report to Mr · Collins 
' ' by letter of August 24, 1951 (R. 219). It was stipulated 
that Exhibit No. 5 is a true and correct copy of that 
report (R. 289, 290). Concerning his examination and 
opinions, Professor Parker testified as follows: 
''A. No. The magnification used for the ex-
amination was about twenty-five times the actual 
size so that we could scrutinize the surface of the 
fracture rather closely. The things that I looked 
for on such a fractured surface are characteristic 
surface markings which indicate, by comparison 
with other things that I have seen in the past 
with known histories, the nature of the surface 
failure; and in particular I always check for evi-
dence of old cracks. 
"Q. Now, as a result of the examination you 
made and as you have described it, you arrived 
at certain opinions and conclusions in regard to 
the exhibit, did you not? 
"A. That's right. And those were stated in 
the letter referred to as Exhibit 1 (T.C.E. 5). 
"Q. Now, did you find in your examination 
any reason to believe that the metal contained in 
the fractured parts was defective 1 
"A. No. 
"Q. And did you arrive at any opinion that 
the part was sound before the fracture? 
''A. Yes. There was no evidence of any de-
fects in the cross-section of the part that had 
fractured. 
14 
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"Q. And did you arrive at an opinion, Pro-
fessor Parker, as to the cause of the fracture or 
failure of Exhibit P (T.C.E. G)~ 
''A. Yes. I would rather refer to the letter, 
which states as one of the conclusions of the 
exa.mina tion 'The fracture was caused by a sudden 
overload (rather than by fatigue-a type of fail-
ure that progresses slowly over a. long period of 
time.)' 
'' Q. And is that your opinion now~ 
"A. Yes, it is." 
Exhibit 6 was then examined by the witness and from 
those photos of the micro-structures he testified that 
there was nothing to indicate either mechanical defects 
or metallurgical defects in the sense of improper heat 
treatment (R. 291). Professor Parker stated in his 
testimony that the structure and properties of the metal 
were suitable for the purpose for which it was used in 
the motor vehicle ( R. 292). The hardness figures (thE:} 
results of a chemical analysis and hardness test by Mr. 
Bradshaw, chemical analyst at the University of Utah 
were stipulated) as a result of test were normal for this 
type of metal and the chemical composition was suitable 
for use in parts of this type according to Professor Par-
ker (R. 293). Upon examining the twisted splines of 
Exhibits G 1, G2, G3, and G4, Professor Parker testified 
that the failure was due to a single overload rather than 
a series of small overloads and that a torsional forte 
was applied to the part (R. 293). In regard to the prob-
lem of rust or exidation, Professor Parker further testi-
fied (R. 295) : 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"A. I don't recall seeing any oxidation on the 
surface of the fracture at the time that I exam-
ined it. If there had been any more than super-
ficial oxidation on the surface, I would have noted 
it because of the fact that one of the things which 
is important in the study of such fractured sur-
faces is to look for evidence of old cracks which 
can be detected by local oxidation in the region 
of the old cracks, which produces a darkened area 
and consequently contrasts sharply with the re-
maining brighter portion of the fractured surface. 
There was no such evidence of an old crack inso-
far as I could determine at the time that I ex-
amined it. 
'' Q. And the time you are speaking about 
was some time toward the latter end of August 
of the year 1951 7 
"A. Yes." 
On cross-examination this same witness stated that 
the force on the pitman arm was from the rear forward 
to produce the clockwise twisting of the splines (R. 295}. 
He also testified that such a fracture would require a 
very large force and a force higher than a driver could 
exert through the steering wheel (R. 296). Upon being 
examined as to the time factor of the fracture, Professor 
Parker testified (R. 298): 
''A. That's right. It is impossible to tell from 
the examination of the fractured part alone any-
thing about the time factor except that this is the 
fracture which is characteristic of a single large 
overload which occurred at one time in contrast 
with the different kind of fracture which occurs 
over a long period of time by progressive growth 
of a crack due to repeated small overloads. 
16 
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"Q. All right. Which are, as I understand, 
you have been referred to the fatigue type of 
fracture. 
''A. That time-consuming type .of fracture is 
called a fatigue fracture because of its gradual 
failure over a period of time.'' 
The defendant General Motors Corporation, after 
having made a motion for dismissal in its favor, called 
Mr. -Millan (Mike) Drakulich, who testified that he owns 
a tavern on Sacramento Pass about forty-six miles east 
of Ely, Nevada and that he also operates a small stock 
ranch (R. 316). He was a friend and neighbor of Mr. 
Wertsderfer (R. 317). Mr. Drakulich described the road 
from the summit of Sacramento Pass to the place of 
the accident as having six curves. The witness first saw 
the truck pass his place of business and it ''was traveling 
a little faster than trucks usually do, down that grade'' 
(R. 319). Then about a half mile below his place of 
business he saw a cloud of dust and someone told him 
there was a wreck down there and he went down to the 
place of the accident (R. 317, 318). He found the truck 
on the left side about twenty-five or thirty feet up on the 
bank (R. 318). Mr. Drakulich went after Mr. and Mrs. 
Wertsderfer for aid and at the scene Mr. Wertderfer 
showed him the broken parts (Exhibits G1 and G4). He 
looked at the parts and saw no rust or discoloration, 
although Wertsderfer attempted to point out that it was 
''oxidized'' (R. 320). 
Mr. Wally Birch was produced by and testified for 
the defendant, General Motors Corporation. Mr. Birch 
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is a resident of Ely, Nevada, since 1936 and has been in 
the automotive repair and garage business sinc'e he was 
a young boy (R. 322). He runs a tow service and has 
seen and examined many wrecks and examined many 
broken parts, including those that have failed by reason 
of being defective (R. 323). Mr. Birch received a call 
and arrived at the scene of the accident on the morning 
,following the occurrence (R. 323). He examined the 
scene, including the truck, tank, and the marks on and 
off the highway (R. 324). He formed the conclusion 
that the truck had rolled over four times and the tank 
was completely separated from it (R. 325). On that 
occasion Mr. Drakulich was present and he and Mr. 
Birch examined the broken steering part and he testified 
that there was no rust on the part or the faces of the 
fracture (R. 326, 327). He described how the truck was 
removed and taken to Ely, Nevada (R. 327). In describ-
ing the truck marks as shown by Exhibit "M ", he testi-
fied that the marks alternated, first one mark on the 
right, then one mark on the left (R. 328). On cross 
examination, Mr. Birch testified that those marks could 
be made while the front wheels were controlled by the 
steering mechanism ( R. 329). He further testified during 
the trial that he could see a bit of rust on the part when 
it was exhibited to him at the triaJ, but that he did not 
see such a condition when he first saw the part on June 
16, 1951 (R. 331). 
Mr. Roy J. Griffin was sworn and testified as a 
witness for the defendant. Mr. Griffin identified himself 
as a man 58 years old and a resident of Saginaw, Michi-
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gan, and that he was employed as Chief Metallurgist for 
the Saginaw Steering Gear Division of General Motors 
Corporation (R. 332, 333). Mr. Griffin is a graduate 
metallurgist and he has followed that profession with 
General :Motors Corporation for his entire career (R. 
333). The Saginaw Steering Gear builds steering gears 
for General Motors and for various other manufactur-
ers, including Ford and Studebaker (R. 333). 
Mr. Griffin detailed the manufacture of this Pitman 
sector shaft from the steel mill to the finished product. 
The shaft is made from a 6120 S.A.E. steel which is 
purchased in 11;4" hot rolled bars from the steel mill. 
Billet samples from the steel mill are taken by Saginaw 
Steering for examination and analysis and they also re-
ceive the analysis reports of the steel mill as it is sampled 
throughout the heats (R. 335, 336). When the bars are 
delivered by the steel mill and the particular heat and 
ingot from which it came is identified by a metal tag and 
the material is not used until it is released as satisfactory 
by the Saginaw Laboratory, which gives the heat a code 
number which may be identified upon the :finished part 
(R. 337). 
Mr. Griffin then continued in his testimony to detail 
the production methods and procedures used in the 
Saginaw Steering Division, including the forming of the 
metal, the heat treatment, and the placing of the splines 
upon the shaft. He further described how the parts are 
assembled (R. 338, 339, 340). 
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The defendant, General Motors Corporation, then . 
produced as a witness Dr. Hyrum E. Flanders. Dr. 
Flanders identified himself as a professor of metallurgy 
at the University of Utah and related extensive educa-
tion and experience in this field ( R. 391). In the month 
of June 1952 Exhibits G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4 were brought 
to Mr. Flanders by one, Mr. Fouts, .Mr. Griffin of the 
Saginaw Steering, and Mr. King, counsel for plaintiff 
(R. 391, 392). Mr. Flanders and these persons met with 
Mr. Bradford, Chemical Analyst of the University of 
Utah, to determine a procedure to follow in the exami-
nation of the part for the consideration of the existence 
of a defect (R. 392). As a result of the examinations 
made by Dr. Flanders, he arrived at the opinion that 
there was no defect whatsoever in the metal. He par-
tticularly noticed that the splines on Exhibit G-1 were 
twisted and he stated that this was caused by twisting 
that had taken place prior to the failure (R. 392, 393). 
A careful examination of the surface revealed no oxida-
tion which might have been present before the fracture 
had taken place and at the trial he observed some super-
ficial rust which was not present at the time of his exami-
nation (R. 393). 
Mr. Arthur W. Harris was then presented and sworn 
on behalf of the defendant, General Motors Corporation. 
Mr. Harris was a resident of Detroit, Michigan, who had 
worked for General Motors Corporation for a period 
over thirty years and has been engaged by this company 
in designing and general engineering testing work, and 
at the time of the trial he was a field product engineer. 
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.. ~. ' 
A good part of the experience of Mr. Harris has been 
to study vehicles under certain conditions to investigate 
difficulties and trouble-determine the cause and effect 
and to make recommendations to the Engineering De-
partment ( R. 401). 
Exhibit "C" was examined by Mr. Harris and the 
marks made by a vehicle as shown on Exhibit '' C '' had 
received his consideration. It was the opinion of Mr. 
Harris that the marks as shown were typical of a "high 
speed tramp." (R. 402). These marks could be made by 
a vehicle while there was a proper connection in the 
vehicle between the steering wheel and the front wheels. 
Mr. Harris then described the activity of a motor 
vehicle that makes this type of mark, and he testified 
that by reason of the spacing of the marks, as testified 
in plaintiff's case by Mr. Collins, that the speed of a 
vehicle to make such marks would be approximately 70 
miles an hour (R. 404). Mr. Harris then described to 
the jury how the marks were made on the highway as 
the vehicle turned abruptly to the left and left the high-
way on that side, and accounted for the appearance and 
disappearance of the various skid marks (R. 405). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The trial court erred in denying motion of de-
fendant General Motors Corporation for dismissal at 
the conclusion of plaintiff's case. 
2. The trial court erred in refusing to direct a ver-
dict for defendant General Motors Corporation. 
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3. The trial court erred in denying motion of de-
fendant General Motors Corporation to set aside verdict 
and enter judgment for said defendant. 
4. The trial court erred in denying motion of de-
fendant General Motors Corporation for a new trial. 
5. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Gordon Wertsderfer, over objection of defendant Gen-
eral Motors Corporation, to testify concerning opinions 
and conclusions of said witness. 
6. The trial court erred in permitting the witness 
Frank Snyder, over objection of defendant General 
Motors Corporation, to testify concerning opinions and 
conclusions of said witness. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
MOTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION FOR DISMISSAL AT THE CON-
CLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE; THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A 
VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
DENYING MOTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL 
MOTORS CORPORATION TO SET ASIDE VER-
DICT AND ENTER JUDGMENT FOR SAID DE-
FENDANT; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
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ING MOTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
So that this Honorable Court may properly appraise 
the evidence in support of plaintiff's theory in the case 
and the lack of evidence to support it, we have set out 
the evidence at some length in support of our position 
that the verdict is not supported by the evidence and 
contrary to the law, and the trial court should have 
granted defendant's motion for a judgment in its favor. 
As stated in Hooper vs. General Motors,---------- Utah 
________ , to impose liability on a manufacturer or assembler 
of an automobile certain necessary elements must be 
made out, and plaintiff is required to show: 
1. A defective wheel at the time of automobile 
assembly. 
2. Such defect being discovered by reasonable In-
spection. 
3. Injury caused by failure of the wheel due to its 
defective condition. 
1. There was no substantial evidence that the pit·-
man sector shaft was defective at the time of manu-
facture or assembly by the defendant General Motors 
Corporation. 
It is true that the elleged expert witnesses for the 
plaintiff, Mr. Wertderfer and Mr. Snyder, testified that 
they discovered rust and oxidation on the part, and that 
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such a condition constituted a "flaw", in their opinion. 
(At this point it is interesting to note that a careful 
examination of the testimony of these witnesses placed 
the alleged rust or oxidation on entirely different places 
on the face of the fractured part.) Mr. Wertsderfer 
stated that it had taken six weeks to discolor the metal 
(R. 174) and Mr. Snyder stated that any opinion on his 
part as to the period of time could only be a guess (R. 
229). Further, the witness Snyder stated that the metal 
from which the part was made was, in his opinion, de-
fective at the time of its manufacture by the steel mill 
(R. 229). This opinion, which was allowed over defend-
ant's objection, was utterly destroyed by the witness 
himself. His only experience in the manufacture of steel 
was some fifty years ago while employed in a steel mill, 
and the nature, type and duration of his employment 
and experience at that time was not shown (R. 217, 218). 
Also this same witness testified: 
''A. It's been so long since I've been around 
an open hearth. I haven't been around an open-
hearth furnace since, let's see, 1901. Yes, say, 
19- well, since 1905, anyway. 
'' Q. And it's probably a lot different today, 
is it not1 
''A. Oh, sure. That's the reason I ain't going 
to say what this steel's made of or what. 
"Q. So the answer is you really have no 
knowledge of the mill processes of manufacturingT 
"A. I know they make steel now that we 
didn't have in the early days. (R. 238). 
"" "" . . . 
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"Q. Now, you mentioned that you have not 
looked at these parts under a glass. 
''A. No, I haven't. That might change my 
opinion on it. 
'' Q. Would you care to look at these parts 
under a glass, Mr. Snyder1 
''A. I can't pass an opinion now, after this 
length of time. Why, hell, I wouldn't give an 
opinion on it. 
"Q. You wouldn't give one at all now¥ 
"A. No." (R. 244, 245.) 
* * * * * 
"Q. I see. You have never paid any attention 
to examining them 1 
''A. No, I've never made a study of it. It's 
really none of my business.'' (R. 245.) 
Thus the testimony of Mr. Snyder offered no real 
probative value to the plaintiff's case and no judgment 
can be predicated upon such' incompetent, unreliable 
and inconclusive testimony. 
No evidence was offered by plaintiff as to when the 
truck was manufactured and assembled by General 
Motors Corporation, or when it left their possession. It 
is perfectly possible that the truck left the possession 
of this defendant a long time before the six weeks men-
tioned by the witness Wertsderfer. Plaintiff cannot 
complain of its failure to produce this evidence as this 
information was easily available and accessible to 
plaintiff. 
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If any question remains as to the plaintiff's proof, 
the court's attention is directed to the testimony of 
Dr. Parker that the part was good and sound in all 
respects, and that its fracture was due to a sudden and 
great overload. This witness, an eminent and qualified 
metallurgist from the University of California, was 
presented by the plaintiff. 
No substantial evidence In the entire record sup-
ports the necessary proof of the first element set forth. 
2. There was no evidence that such defect, if it 
existed at all, was discoverable by reasonable inspection. 
A search of the record for any evidence to support 
this proposition is in vain, and, on the contrary, the 
defendant General Motors Corporation revealed at the 
trial its inspections and precautionary method of manu-
facture. The metal bars were purchased from the steel 
mill, with a constant check on its quality, from the pour-
ing of the ingots at the mill to its receipt by General 
Motors Corporation (R. 335, 336, 337). Visual, manual 
and scientific tests and controls were carefully used in 
the fabrication of the part by this defendant (R. 337 to 
342, incl). No challenge was made by plaintiff concerning 
the propriety as to these methods by General Motors, 
nor did the plaintiff claim any failure on the part of 
General Motors Corporation to properly perform its 
obligations in this respect. No evidence was introduced 
by plaintiff, or anyone else, even suggesting that the 
procedures as outlined by Mr. Griffith of the Saginaw 
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Steering Gear Company were inadequate or improper. 
Both of plaintiff's alleged experts, W ertsderfer and 
Snyder, properly ignored this subject, as they both ad-
mittedly had no knowledge of the automotive industry 
or its methods, processes or problems. Again, Professor 
Parker, produced by this plaintiff, stated that the type 
and character of the metal used was perfectly proper 
for the use to which it was applied. 
3. No substantial evidence was produced by the 
plaintiff that the injury to plOJintiff was caused by the 
fa,ilure of the pitman sector shaft due to its defective 
condition. 
In discussing the proposition of whether the injury 
to plaintiff was caused by the failure of the pitman sector 
shaft due to its defective condition, we can begin with 
the basic proposition that the causal connection between 
the alleged negligent act of the defendant and the injury 
to plaintiff is never presumed, and that this is a subject 
that plaintiff is required to prove affirmatively. 
Jackson vs. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 Pac. 2d 
566. 
The plaintiff testified that in proceeding down Sac-
ramento Pass he had rounded a curve to the right and 
had gotten himself over to the left of the center line of 
the highway, and as he noticed himself over on the left-
hand side of the road he pulled himself back on the 
righthand side (R. 127). It is apparent that at this time 
he had control of his steering. The plaintiff then testified 
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that he again caught himself in the middle of the road 
and turned it back to the right side of the road (R. 127). 
At this time he had control of his steering. The vehicle 
being driven by plaintiff then gradually went over to the 
right side of the road until the right wheel was off the 
surfaced portion of the highway. See Exhibit C. The 
plaintiff has no idea back . of this point where he lost 
control of the steering, but on cross-examination he 
stated that he made this statement upon a prior depo-
sition: 
"Q. I will ask you, Mr. Northern, whether or 
not, on that occasion, you made this statement: 
'No sir. When I tried to turn it back to the right 
again, after pulling it from the right side, pull 
it to the left, and after trying to straighten it 
back to the right again, I could not straighten 
it. That's when I hit the brakes.' 
''A. Yes sir. I did. 
"Q. And right after that do you recall this 
question: 'And what was the sensation on the 
steering wheel as you tried to pull it back from 
the right side of the road 1" 
'A. Well just wasn't nothing to turn it back 
with.' 
"Q. You made that statement, did you noU 
''A. Yes sir, I did. 
''Q. And will you listen to the following ques-
tions and answers, Mr. Northern, on the same 
occasion on the deposition: 'Q. You didn't try 
to spin it at all back~' 
" 'A. Well it done happened, sir. Didn't have 
enough time to do all that. Just steering it, I 
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imaging around eight, ten inches; something like 
that.' 
'' 'Q. Then you started tipping over? 
'''A. It was going over then. 
'' 'Q. You were going over then? 
" 'A. Yes sir.' 
"Q. Did you testify to that effect upon the 
taking of this deposition~ 
''A. I don't recollect that, sir. 
''Q. Do you deny now, Mr. Northern, that you 
made such a statement on that occasion? 
"A. No sir. I do not deny it. I just don't 
recollect it. 
'' Q. And you could have made such a state-
ment, is that right? 
"A. Possible." (R. 130, 131.) 
If, as plaintiff testified, that when the truck was on 
the right side of the road with the right wheel on the 
shoulder, he was able to "snatch" the truck from this 
position, again he had control of his steering, and an 
examination of Exhibit 3 will show that at the time he 
claims to have lost control of his steering that he was 
already tipping over as testified above. Exhibit 3 shows 
this vividly by the appearance and disappearance of the 
skid marks of the Northern vehicle crossing the highway 
immediately before leaving the highway on the left side. 
Thus the plaintiff in his own testimony gives a descrip-
tion of being able to control the vehicle right up to the 
time it skidded across the highway out of control. 
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Neither a review of the testimony of the alleged 
experts, Mr. Wertsderfer or Mr. Snyder, shows any 
evidence from which it is shown or can be inferred that 
the part failed prior to the truck being upset. Quite the 
contrary, Mr. Wertsderfer testified on cross-examination 
that there appeared to be a twist on the splines of the 
fractured sector shaft, and that it would take great force 
to twist the splines on that part (R. 186). Mr. Snyder 
testified that the twist on the splines of the fractured 
exhibit meant that there had been an excessive strain 
on the part (R. 236). In addition to the foregoing Dr. 
Parker stated that the examination of the fractured part 
and the twisting of the splines was due to a single over-
load, caused by a torsional force (R. 293). 
The testimony of Professor Parker is the only evi-
dence produced by plaintiff as to the cause of the acci-
dent. Neither W ertsderfer, Snyder or Jensen testified 
as to the cause of the accident. There was, therefore, not 
only a failure to prove causation but positive proof by 
pla!intiff to the contrary. 
The foregoing is the extent to which the plaintiff 
attempted to prove the necessary element of proximate 
causation, and the defendant contends that surh ele-
ment was not proved by either direct evidence or by a 
reasonable inference. On the other hand, the defendant 
together with plaintiff in its case clearly proved that 
the failure of the pitman sector shaft was caused by a 
great and sudden overload, by a torsional force and, 
according to Dr. Parker, a force of such a character that 
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it could not have been exerted by the driver of the 
vehicle ( R. 296). 
The appellant subscribes to the nature of a cause of 
action in the case of a manufacturer's liability as origi-
nally determined by the leading case of MacPherson vs. 
Buick Jlotor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, 
and as later adopted in the Restatement of the Law of 
Torts in Section 388, and as set forth by Justice Wolfe 
in the case of Hooper vs. General Motors Corporation, 
supra. The defendant seriously contends that all of the 
elements of such a cause of action must be affirmatively 
proved by plaintiff. 
A basic problem of this type of case is the considera-
tion by the Court of two possibilities and the plaintiff 
presents the proposition (1) that the broken part caused 
the accident and the contention of the defendant (2) 
that the part was broken by reason of the accident. 
To argue the first possibility one is required to 
indulge in a degree of speculation and conjecture not 
justified by but contrary to the law and the evidence in 
this case as shown by plaintiff's own evidence. Even 
though the evidence clearly lends its weight and prepon-
derance in favor of the defendant, if we admit that the 
two possibilities are on a parity, the trial court never-
theless erred in its ruling. This court has held that when 
a wrong or injury has been brought about from one or 
the other of two occurrences either one of which may have 
been the sole ~roximate cause, and the defendant 
could be responsible for one only, the dcfcndaftt must 
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prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defen-
dant's wrong was the sole approximate cause. 
This was the holding in Tremelling YS. Southern 
Pacific (51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80) and consistently fol-
lowed and later announced in Sumsion vs. Streater, 
Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, (132 Pac. (2d) 680). 
In the Sumsion case this court stated: 
''While deductions may be based on probabili-
ties, the evidence must do more than merely raise 
a conjecture or show a probability. Where there 
are probabilities the other way equally or more 
potent the deductions are mere guesses and the 
jury should not be permitted to speculate. The 
rule is well established in this jurisdiction that 
where 'the proximate cause of the injury is left 
to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a matter 
of law.' Tremelling v. Southern Pacific Co., 51 
Utah 189, 170 P. 80, 84; Tremelling v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 70 Utah 72, 257 P. 1066. Many cases 
are cited in support of this proposition and the 
court quoted with approval from 29 Cyc. 625 
where it is stated: 'The evidence must, however, 
do more than merely raise a conjecture or show 
a probability as to the cause of the injury, and no 
recovery can be had if the evidence leaves it to 
conjecture which of two probable causes resulted 
in the injury, where defendant was liable for only 
one of them.' '' 
This court has repeatedly held that the doctrine of 
the Tremelling case applies where plaintiff's evidence 
shows the two possibilities as to cause. 
D. & R G. Ys. Ind. Com., 66 Ut. 494, 243 Pac. 800. 
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Peterson vs. Richards, 73 Ut. 59, 272 Pac. 229. 
In this connection the court's attention is invited 
to the case of Fisher vs. Sheppard, 366 Pa. 34 7, 77 A ( 2d) 
417, where a tractor trailer crashed into the rear of a 
building and plaintiff alleged that the accident was 
caused by a defective sleeve in the differential. That 
court said: 
"We are of the opinion that the evidence is 
not sufficient to establish this basic fact. Cer-
tainly, proof of a broken sleeve itself, in the cir-
cumstances here presented, will not support a 
finding that it ''ras defective prior to the collision 
of the tractor with the Fisher building. A finding 
that the break resulted from the terrific impact 
is equally probable. Where two conclusions can 
be had from given circumstances, one of which 
would create liability and the other negative lia-
bility, a jury may not be permitted to indulge in 
conjecture and negligence cannot be. predicated 
thereon.'' 
We are aware that the respondents will point to the 
fact that the witnesses Snyder and W ertsderfer testified 
that there was a "flaw" in the Pitman sector shaft by 
reason of the rust they purported to see. This was true 
in the case of Livesley vs. Continental Motors Corp., 331 
Mich. 434, 49 N.W. (2d) 365. In this case plaintiffs 
asserted that a defective connecting rod in an airplane 
engine broke causing the engine to freeze and the subse-
quent crash. A witness for plaintiff testified in that 
case: "It is a flaw in the forging ... definitely it was 
not checked. It would have shown up.'' The plaintiff 
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made further proof in that case than did Mr. Northern. 
The Michigan Court stated, as follows: 
"We do not overlook the testimony of plain-
tiff's witness Stevens referring to the break of 
the piston end of the connecting rod in question, 
''It is a flaw in the forging. * * * definitely it 
was not checked. It would have shown up." 
But the witness further testified : 
"Q. What test do they make~ ~ 
''A. Well, I don't understand what they 
make, but I understood they run parts as 
critical as this through an x-ray machine on 
an assembly line to show up flawed parts. 
Whether they do on anything as small as this 
I am not sure, but they should. 
"Q. Do you know anything about the magna-
flux process~ 
''A. No, I don't.'' 
"It is apparent that his statement, "It would 
have shown up,'' is the expression of an opinion 
which has no basis of any knowledge of the wit-
ness and is without evidentiary force. 
''The case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 
217 ,N. Y. 382 (111 N.E. 1050), was brought to 
recover damages because of personal injuries 
caused by reason of a defective wheel of an auto-
mobile sold by defendant to a dealer by whom 
the automobile was sold to plaintiff. The wheel 
was the product of another manufacturer. The 
wheel was defective and the defect was the cause 
of the injury to plaintiff. The defect of the whet>l 
could have bel'n discovered by reasonable inspec-
tion, which inspection was omitted. 
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"The opinion in the MacPherson case among 
other things stated as follows (111 N.E. 1055) : 
"It (defendant) was a manufacturer of auto-
mobiles. It was responsible for the finished 
product. It was not at liberty to put the 
finished product on the market without sub-
jecting the component parts to ordinary and 
simple tests. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co. 
v. Elliott, 149 U. S. 266, 272, 13 Sup. Ct. 837, 
37 L. Ed. 728. Under the charge of the trial 
judge nothing more was required of it. The 
obligation to inspect must vary with the nature 
of the thing to be inspected. The more pro b-
able the danger the greater the need of cau-
tion.'' 
"In the instant case the testimony shows that 
the defect could not have been discovered by 
reasonable inspection, thus the instant case is 
differentiated from the MacPherson case. 
''The New York court further ruled in Smith 
v. Peerless Glass Co., 181 N.E. 576, at page 578, 
'There was, therefore a duty to use reasonable 
care. Reasonable care consists ainong other things 
in making such inspections and tests during the 
course of manufacture and after the article is 
completed as the manufacturer should recognize 
as reasonably necessary to secure the production 
of a safe article,' with which rule the defendant 
in the instant case is shown to have complied. 
''It is unnecessary in this case to review ex-
haustively the authorities as to liability of manu-
facturer when negligence is shown because the 
negligence counted on in the instant case was not 
shown. 
"For failure to prove the negligence which 
plaintiff counted on, plaintiff was without a suffi-
cient case to go to the jury.'' 
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In the instant case there is no evidence that the 
defect, if it existed, could have been discovered by a 
reasonable inspection by General Motors Corporation, or 
that it caused the accident. The Court is reminded that 
the witness W ertsderfer testified that a crack in the part 
could have been seen if it had been one-thousandth of an 
inch (R. 200) and the witness Snyder testified that it 
was inside the part (R. 247). It is interesting to note, and 
assuming the partial oxidation, that no one for the plain-
tiff testified that the remaining part where the metal was 
joined and not cracked was not capable of performing 
properly and that it would have broken in that condition 
under normal and reasonable use. 
The case of Harward vs. General Motors Corpora-
tion, 235 N. C. 88, 68 S. E. (2) 455, was a case where 
the plaintiff alleged a defective steering mechanism. The 
court in that case stated : 
"Whether the failure of the steering gear to 
fit as indicated by the plaintiff and his witness 
was due to the natural wear or hard and fast 
driving or lack of lubrication is left in doubt. 
There is a complete absence of testimony that any 
cotter key or other essential part of the mechan-
ism was left out, or that any improper parts were 
used. There is no substantial evidence that there 
was anything wrong with the steering equipment 
of the automobile at the time it was sold to thl' 
plaintiff, nor is there substantial evidence in the 
record which tends to prove that the condition in 
which the steering mechanism was found after 
the accident was due to all~' fault or negligem·e 
either of omission or of commission on the part 
of either of the defendants. Shroder v. Barron-
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Dady ~Iot. Co., App. 111 S. W. 2d 66; O'Hara v. 
Gen. ·Motors Corp., 35 F. Supp. 319; Bird v. Ford 
.l\Iotor Co., 15 F. Supp. 590; Supera v. Moreland 
Sales Corp., 56 P. :2d 595; :MacPherson v. Buick 
~Iotor Co., :217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050; Davlin 
Y. Henry Ford & Son, Inc., 20 Fed. 2d 317. 
''X egligence is never presumed from the mere 
fact of an accident or injury. The plaintiff has 
the burden of establishing by appropriate proof 
not only negligence but that such negligence was 
the proximate cause of the injury complained of. 
The plaintiff must also establish by his evidence 
a casual relation between the alleged negligence 
and the injury upon which a recovery is sought. 
Evidence that merely takes the matter into the 
realm of conjecture is insufficient. Rountree v. 
Fountain, 203, N. C. 381, 166 S. E. 329; Lynch v. 
Telephone Co., 204 N.C. 252, 167 S. E. 847. Plain-
tiff~s evidence at most raises a suspicion or a 
conjecture, but fails to establish actionable negli-
gence or any casual relation between the condition 
of the automobile when it was purchased and the 
accident resulting in plaintiff's injury more than 
nine months later." 
It is anticipated that the respondent will argue that 
there was sufficient evidence on which the jury could 
deduce the necessary ultimate inferences. Thirty years 
ago this Court held that while juries are given great 
latitude in deducing inferences from established facts, 
they nevertheless are not permitted to base an inference 
upon an inference and a finding based upon such would 
be mere speculation and conjecture. l{arren vs. Bair, 63 
Utah 344, 225 Pac. 10g-4. Although such rule has been 
the subject of much confusion, this Court has not de-
parted from it. 
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We believe that one of the best statements regarding 
the question of an inference upon an inference is con-
tained in the case of New York Life Insurance Company 
vs. MeNeely, 52 Ariz. 181, 79 Pac. (2d} 948, wherein it 
was stated: '' ... the Courts do not mean that under no 
circumstances may an inference be drawn from an infer-
ence, but rather the prior inferences must be established 
to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory rather 
than merely by a probability, in order that the last 
inference of the probability of the ultimate fact may 
be based thereon.'' 
In applying the facts of the instant case, the plain-
tiff must rely upon an inference that the alleged "flaw", 
if it existed at all, existed at the time the truck was in 
the possession of the General Motors Corporation. Upon 
this inference we must then further draw the inference 
that it was a "flaw" that was discoverable by reasonable 
inspection. Again, based upon these two successive in-
ferences, it is necessary to infer that by reason of the 
"flaw" the part was so weak that it was unable to with-
stand normal and reasonable use. 
To further carry on this weird sequence and again 
based upon the prior deductions, we are asked to infer 
that the alleged defective part caused the accident and 
that it was not broken during the violence of the accident 
itself. 
It can readily be seen that in order to reach the 
ultimate conclusion necessary to sustain the verdict in 
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this rase that all of the inferences are at the best but 
possibilities and that they are not probabilities nor 
established to the exclusion of any other theory. 
In discussing the foregoing, the Appellant is aware 
of the statement made by Chief Justice Wolfe in the 
ease of Hooper vs. General :Motors Corporation, supra, 
as follows: ''Certainly, reasonable men from the cumu-
latiYe factual total could infer, and with the considera-
tion of rim-spider separation may have inferred, that 
the ·wheel ·was defective at the time of assembly.'' The 
Court is reminded that that case was an appeal by the 
plaintiff after a verdict of no cause of action and was 
reversed on the basis that a certain instruction was im-
proper and prejudicial. 
The records and briefs in that case will show that 
there was no issue concerning the elements of a cause 
of action of a manufacturer's liability and the necessary 
evidence to support such a cause of action. The state-
ment quoted was unnecessary dicta in that case and we 
seriously urge this Court to reconsider its effect and 
clarify the same. The case does not support the con--
clusion of Justice Wolfe "that the wheel was defective 
at the time of assembly." 
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POINT NO.5 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE WITNESS, GORDON WERTSDERFER, OVER 
OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS 
CORPORATION, TO TESTIFY CONCERNING OPIN-
IONS AND CONCLUSIONS OF WITNESS. 
It is apparent to any tyro that consideration of 
problems involving the cause and effect of metal failures 
is a highly technical and scientific subject and one which 
requires specialized training. Over the defendant's ob-
jection the Trial Court allowed the plaintiff to present 
the witness Gordon W ertsderfer as an expert and to 
testify before the jury concerning his opinions and con-
clusions. The witness W ertsderfer qualified himself as 
a welder, machinist, and construction worker. In addi-
tion he related that he had read articles on metallurgy 
as published by the American Welding Society and a 
concern referred to as the Oxweld Welding Equipment 
(R. 170, 171). On the other hand he stated that he had no 
knowledge of steering mechanisms for vehicles and that 
he had never followed the automobile line (R. 163). 
A reading of Mr. Wertsderfer's testimony on Voir 
Dire examination will show that he did not post-'es!:-' the 
specialized knowledge necessary. It is submitted that 
the witness was not qualified and that the ruling of th~ 
Court was in error. 
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POINT NO.6 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE WITXESS, FRANK SNYDER, OVER OBJEC-
TIOX OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS COR-
PORATION, TO TESTIFY CONCERNING OPINIONS 
AND COXCLUSIONS OF SAID WITNESS. 
Over the objection of the defendant, the plaintiff 
presented the witness, Frank Snyder, as an expert and 
the Court allowed his testimony, which included opinions 
and conclusions on a metallurgical subject. The objec-
tion to this witness was even more pointed than the 
objection to the witness Wertsderfer. The Court is 
reminded that the parties stipulated that the record may 
be considered as showing objections to all opinions and 
conclusions. This was done to expedite the trial. Mr. 
Snyder qualified himself as a machinist for over a long 
period of years. 
On Voir Dire examination the witness admittedly 
had done no testing in regard to stress or strain of 
metals and had made no special study for the cause of 
breaks (R. 220). The same witness testified as follows: 
''A. It's been so long since I've been around 
an open hearth. I haven't been around an open-
hearth furnace since, let's see, 1901. Yes, say, 
19- well, since 1905, anyway. 
"Q. And it's probably a lot different today, 
is it not~ 
"A. Oh, sure. That's the reason I ain't going 
to say what this steel's made of or what. 
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"Q. So the answer is you really hav~ no 
knowledge of the mill processes of manufactunngf 
''A. I know they make steel now that we 
didn't have in the early days. (R. 238). 
* * * * * 
"Q. Now, you mentioned that you have not 
looked at these parts under a glass. 
"A. No, I haven't. That might change my 
opinion on it. 
"Q. Would you care to look at these parts 
under a glass, Mr. Snyder~ 
"A. I can't pass an opinion now, after this 
length of time. Why, hell, I wouldn't give an 
opinion on it. 
"Q. You wouldn't give one at all nowT 
''A. No. (R. 244, 245.) 
* * * * * 
"Q. I see. You have never paid any attention 
to examining them? 
''A. No, I've never made a study of it. It's 
. really none of my business." (R. 245). 
It is apparent and obvious that the witness was not 
only unqualified but the lack of qualifications and 
necessary knowledge and experience were admitted by 
him. The Appellant seriously contends that the subject 
of metallurgy and the cause and effect of metal failures 
is a subject requiring special and peculiar knowledge 
and experience, and that the witness must affirmativPly 
show these qualifications. Seward vs. Natural Gas Co. 
of New Jersey, 1 N. J. Super. 1:24, 78 A. 2d 129; ( 1anonico 
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vs. Cellanese Corporation, 11 N. J. Super. 455, 78 A. 
(2d) 411; Mary Jane Stevens Co. vs. First National Bank 
Building Co., 89 Utah 456, 57 Pac. (2d) 1099. Of par-
ticular interest is the case of Duntley vs. Inman, Poulsen 
& Co., 42 Ore. 334, 70 Pac. 529. In that case the witness 
was a mill hand whose duty it was to repair and look 
after the pullies. He examined a broken pulley after 
~
the accident and upon trial,....asked what caused the pulley 
to break. He was not allowed to answer on the basis 
that it was not shown that he possessed any special 
knowledge on the subject and showed no experience in 
the manufacture or testing of machinery of that kind. 
The Appellant recognizes the wide discretion of the 
Trial Court in determining whether or not a witness is 
qualified but submits to this honorable Court that there 
was an abuse of such discretion. 
September, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
By Leonard W. Elton 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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